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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the determinants of working capital management (WCM) for a sample of Spanish 
firms during the period 1997-2004. We find that firms have a target investment in working capital and 
that they take decisions in order to achieve this. The results appear to support the hypothesis that the 
working capital competes with investment in fixed assets for the funds of the firms when they have 
financial constraints. Finally, we also find that WCM depends on bargaining power and other financial 
factors such as the availability of internal finance, cost of financing and financial constraints.   
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1. Introduction 
Since the seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958) showing that a firm´s financial structure is 
irrelevant to investment, the literature on investment decisions has been enlarged by many theoretical and 
empirical contributions. It has shown that in the presence of market imperfections, firms may prefer one 
source of funds over another because of a wide cost-wedge between internal and external funding 
sources. Myers and Majluf (1984) show that firms present a preference for internal over external funds, 
and in the case of external funds, a company prefers debt before equities. In fact, Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen, (1988) test the financing hierarchy hypothesis and suggest that the firms´ investment may 
depend on financial factors such as the availability of internal finance, access to capital markets or cost of 
financing.  
The investment that firms make in current assets, as well as the current liabilities used, represents the 
main share of items on a firm´s balance sheet. In fact, in our sample they represent more than 50 per cent 
of the firms´ total assets and total liabilities. Decisions about how much to invest in receivable accounts 
and inventories, and how much credit to accept from suppliers, are reflected in the management of firms’ 
working capital. This may have an important impact on the profitability and liquidity of the firm (Shin 
and Soenen, 1998), so firms have to evaluate the trade-off between expected profitability and liquidity 
risk before deciding the working capital policy to adopt. 
Despite the importance of working capital management for the profitability of the firms (Smith, 1980; 
Soenen, 1993; Jose, Lancaster and Stevens, 1996; Shin and Soenen, 1998; Deloof, 2003; and Garcia and 
Martinez, 2007), there has been little work on the empirical determinants of the working capital 
management. Chiou, Cheng and Wu (2006) analyze firm characteristics and macroeconomic factors that 
might affect working capital management for companies from Taiwan. Kieschnick, Laplante and 
Moussawi (2006) also study the determinants of WCM, in this case, for a sample of US companies. 
However, these studies have several limitations. First, they do not control for endogeneity. Second, none 
of these existing empirical studies has shown the possible existence of a target level of the measures of 
working capital management, even though its existence appears to be evident. Several previous studies 
(Nadiri, 1969; Emery, 1984: Blinder, 1986, among others) have shown that firms have target or optimal 
levels for their individual components such as accounts receivable, inventories and accounts payable. 
Moreover, under imperfect capital markets, firms have to evaluate the trade-off between costs and 
benefits of maintaining a larger investment in working capital.  
In this paper we attempt to extend the empirical research on working capital management in a number of 
ways. First, in contrast to the existing empirical studies, this paper adopts a dynamic framework, which 
assumes that firms have a target investment in working capital and that they adjust their current 
investment gradually over time because of adjustment costs. Second, we use panel data because it allows 
us to control for unobservable heterogeneity, making it possible to exclude biases deriving from the 
existence of individual effects. Third, we use two-step GMM estimator to avoid the problem of possible 
endogeneity. For example, several studies have shown how the measures of the working capital 
management affect profitability and firms´ sales. Finally, we present empirical evidence for a sample of 
Spanish firms in the context of the continental model, which is characterised by less-developed capital 
markets (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 1998), low investor protection and high 
concentration of ownership. It allows our results to be compared with others obtained for companies with 
different financial systems.  
Following Shin and Soenen (1998), we use the Net Trade Cycle (NTC) as a measure of working capital 
management. NTC indicates the number of “days sales” the firm has to finance its working capital under 
ceteris paribus conditions. Our findings indicate that firms have a target Net Trade Cycle and they adjust 
their current Net Trade Cycle to their target gradually over time because of adjustment costs. Moreover, 
the speed of adjustment is relatively quick, which may be because being in disequilibrium is costly for 
this sample. On the other hand, the results reported in this study suggest that firms that are capable of 
generating more internal funds have a longer cycle. The results also lend support for Fazzari and 
Petersen´s (1993) argument that working capital competes with the investment in fixed assets for the 
funds of the firms when they suffer financial constraints. The hypothesis that companies with a greater 
bargaining power follow a more aggressive working capital policy is also supported by the findings of 
this paper. Finally, our results suggest that Net Trade Cycle also depends on other financial factors such 
as the cost of financing and financial constraints. Thus, we obtain that growth opportunities, probability 
of financial distress and cost of external financing negatively affect NTC. However, we do not find 
support for the hypothesis that leverage influences the measures of working capital management.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the hypotheses and 
reviews the previous studies on working capital management. In section 3 we describe the empirical 
model and data. We present our results in section 4 and relate them to earlier findings. Finally, the main 
conclusions are presented in Section 6.    
 
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses.  
In perfect capital markets, investment decisions of a firm are independent of its financial situation 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Since there is no capital rationing, firms can always obtain external 
financing without problem, so the firms´ investment should be driven only by expected future profitability 
and, therefore, should not be affected by the availability of internal funds. However, in imperfect markets, 
the firms´ investment may depend on financial factors such as the availability of internal finance, access 
to capital markets or cost of financing (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988). Under this situation, the 
working capital level held by companies may also be sensitive to these financial factors.  
The Net Trade Cycle (NTC) and Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) are the most popular measures of 
working capital management used in previous works, due to the criticism of static measures (Gitman, 
1974; Kamath, 1989). Both of these measures are a dynamic measure of ongoing liquidity management, 
and they are closely correlated. The CCC is calculated as (accounts receivables/sales)*365 + 
(inventories/cost of sales)*365 - (accounts payable/purchases)*365 and shows the time lag between 
expenditure for the purchase of raw materials and the collection of sales of finished goods (Deloof, 2003). 
So, the longer this time lag, the larger the investment in working capital. The Net Trade Cycle (NTC) is 
basically equal to the CCC, but the three components (accounts receivable, inventories and accounts 
payable) are expressed as a percentage of sales, so indicating the number of “days sales” the firm has to 
finance its working capital (Shin and Soenen, 1998). According to these authors, this last measure 
provides an easy estimate for additional financing needs with regard to working capital expressed as a 
function of the projected sales growth. They supported the use of the NTC to measure working capital 
management efficiency, since all three components are expressed as a percentage of sales which is more 
useful.  
Increasing these cycles may positively affect firms´ profitability for two reasons. First, it may increase 
firms´ sales (Blinder and Maccini,1991; Smith, 1987; Emery, 1987; Deloof and Jegers, 1996; Petersen 
and Rajan, 1997; and Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999). These works show that firms´ sales increase when 
they increase their investment in inventories or trade credit granted. Second, Ng et al., (1999) and Wilner 
(2000) also demonstrate that firms may get important discounts for early payments which reduce their 
supplier financing. However, this benefit has to offset the costs of a larger investment in working capital 
when firms operate under imperfect capital markets. First, firms have a financing cost. Second, the main 
cost of holding a higher working capital level is the opportunity cost, because a firm may forgo other 
more productive investments in order to hold that level. Finally, and according to Soenen (1993), longer 
cycles might also lead companies to bankruptcy.  
Hence, under imperfect capital markets, companies may have an optimal Net Trade Cycle that balances 
the costs and benefits of maintaining it and which maximizes their value. In addition, since a longer cycle 
indicates a need for additional capital, it may depend on agency costs, asymmetric information and 
financial distress, because these lead to a higher cost of financing external and credit rationing.  
 
Asymmetric Information and Agency conflicts 
Asymmetric information and agency costs could lead to either underinvestment or overinvestment. On the 
one hand, given the limited liability of shareholders, they might carry out riskier investment projects 
(problem of overinvestment), because shareholders would benefit from the firm’s higher value, while 
creditors would suffer the possible losses (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, the conflict 
between shareholders and creditors, according to Myers (1977), can also lead to a problem of 
underinvestment, because given the priority of creditors in case of bankruptcy, shareholders may decide 
not to carry out or to abandon investment projects with a positive net present value when the net present 
value of the investment is less than the amount of debt issued. Consequently, firms have to pay a risk 
premium, which results in a higher cost for external sources of funds. In this sense, the pecking order 
theory of Myers (1984) states that firms give priority to resources generated internally over debt and new 
equity. Following this line, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Myers and Majluf (1984) suggested that a 
shortage of internally generated funds may lead to firm underinvestment. This idea has been supported by 
several earlier studies that have demonstrated that the amount of corporate investment is affected by its 
internal financing (Fazzari et al., 1988; Carpenter, 1995; Kadapakkam, Kumar and Riddick, 1998; Hoshi, 
Kashyap and Scharfstein., 1991; Hadlock, 1998; Cleary, 1999; Moyen, 2004). The empirical evidence 
suggests it might be due, as we commented above, to the higher risk premium demanded because of 
asymmetric information and the agency conflicts. Greenwald et al., (1984), on the other hand, suggest 
that asymmetric information may also result in credit rationing in competitive markets, which might also 
affect the level of firms´ investment. Hence, and taking into account these hypothesis, internal funds 
should also positively influence the firms´ working capital investment, as is demonstrated by Fazzari and 
Petersen (1993). 
Growth opportunities is another variable that might affect working capital management, because firms 
with higher growth perspectives have more severe agency conflicts between creditors and shareholders 
(Myers, 1977) and larger asymmetric information due to their value being largely determined by these 
growth perspectives (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  Thus, we would expect these companies to have a shorter 
cycle. The results obtained by the empirical evidence, however, lead to opposite conclusions about the 
effects of this variable. Kieschnick et al., (2006) show that this variable positively influences Cash 
Conversion Cycle for US firms, while Chiou et al., (2006) do not find any relation between these 
variables.  
These problems, on the other hand, are also sensitive to leverage, according to the existing literature. The 
results obtained by Krishnawami et al., (1999) appear to indicate that agency conflicts between 
shareholders and creditors decrease also with private debt, which predominates in Spain. In this line, to 
the extent that debt ratio acts as a proxy for the ability of the firms to obtain debt it would be expected 
that firms with higher leverage (greater ability to raise debt) will hold more investment in working capital.  
Firm size is another factor influencing these agency costs. The agency problem between shareholders and 
creditors is expected to be attenuated by size (Smith and Warner, 1979), since smaller firms suffer more 
severe asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders (Jordan et al., 1998; and Berger et al., 
2001), due to the fact that less public information is available to them. Thus, this factor would be 
expected to positively influence the length of this cycle. However, we should also mention that this 
variable has also been associated in the literature with the firm´s bargaining power with its suppliers and 
customers, showing that larger firms have a greater bargaining power, so they might have a shorter NTC. 
According to Long et al. (1993), Lee and Stowe (1993), and Pike, Cheng, Cravens and Lamminmaki 
(2005), smaller firms have to extend more credit to guarantee their products, given their lower 
reputations. In addition, they are offered less trade credit (Niskanen and Niskanen, 2006). With regard to 
the results obtained from the empirical evidence, they lead to contrary conclusions about the effect of this 
variable on the measures of working capital management (Moss and Stine (1993); Jose et al., (1996); 
Kieschnick et al., (2006) and Chiou et al., (2006).  
Finally, we also expect investment in fixed assets to influence Net Trade Cycle. The problems of 
asymmetric information and agency conflict between shareholders and creditors are expected to be more 
serious for companies with lower fixed investment and greater intangible assets, because these latter 
assets cannot be easily valued by potential external investors and these firms would have a lower 
liquidation value of their assets. Thus, shareholders might decide to carry out greater risk projects in these 
firms if the liquidation value of their assets is lower than the debt value. Moreover, asset tangibility 
increases the value that can be recaptured by creditors in bankruptcy. Thus, we should expect a positive 
relation between this variable and the Net Trade Cycle. However, when firms operate under imperfect 
capital markets, they bear financial constraints, so this variable might compete with the working capital 
for firm´s capital in this situation, as is reported by Fazzari and Petersen (1993) and Kieschnick et al. 
(2006). 
Financial distress 
We also introduce the variable probability of financial distress because the agency conflicts commented 
above are more pronounced for financially distress firms. The costs of financial distress arise when the 
firm cannot meet its payment obligations either in the short or the long term. This can affect the Net 
Trade Cycle of firms, since companies with a greater probability of financial distress have more 
difficulties in obtaining capital. Given that a longer cycle indicates a need for additional capital, these 
firms might have a shorter NTC.  
 
3.  Method and Data 
3.1. Method 
Following the theories described in the previous section and considering the costs and benefits of keeping 
working capital, we assume that firms have a target Net Trade Cycle. Firms´current Net Trade Cycle may 
not always equal their desired cycle and, hence, firms might take time to adjust from actual to the desired 
cycle. This can be for several reasons. Nadiri (1969), for instance, suggests that firms cannot always 
estimate their sales accurately and with certainty, and hence neither their purchases; they do not 
accurately anticipate changes in monetary policy or in the rates of default and bad debts on their trade 
credit; and the discovery and collection of delinquent accounts take time and involve costs which may be 
distributed over time. 
Like Shin and Soenen (1998), we use the Net Trade Cycle as dependent variable, which is calculated by 
the following expression: NTC= (accounts receivables/ sales)*365 + (inventories/sales)*365 - (accounts 
payable/sales)*365. Thus, it provides an easy estimate for additional financing needs with regard to 
working capital expressed as a function of the projected sales growth. 
With regard to the independent variables, the capacity to generate internal funds is proxied by the variable 
cash flow (CFLOW), defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax plus depreciation to sales.  
We use two proxies to measure the growth opportunities. GROWTH1 is calculated by the ratio market-to-
book value of assets ((market value of equity + market value of debt) / total assets), while GROWTH2 is 
defined as the ratio market-to-book value of equity (market value of equity / book value of equity).  
The ratio of total debt over total assets (LEV) is used as proxy for the leverage. We use the natural 
logarithm of assets (SIZE1) and the natural logarithm of sales (SIZE2) to measure the size. The investment 
in fixed assets (FA) of the firm is measured by the ratio tangible fixed assets over total assets.  
The likelihood of financial distress (ZSCORE) is calculated according to the re-estimation of Altman´s 
(1968) model carried out by Bergley et al., (1996), given by the following expression:  
ZSCOREit = 0,104*X1 + 1,010*X2 + 0,106*X3 + 0,003*X4 + 0,169*X5 
where X1 = Working capital / Total assets; X2 =Retained earnings / Total assets; X3 = Net operating 
profits /Total assets; X4 = Market value of capital / Book value of debt; X5 = Sales / Total assets. Thus, a 
higher ZSCORE implies a lower probability of insolvency.     
Finally, taking into account the previous studies on the determinants of working capital management and 
the theories described in section 2, we also introduce the variables cost of external finance (FCOST) and 
profitability (PRO) as independent variables. We expect firms with a higher cost of external finance to 
hold a smaller NTC, since the cost of funds invested in it is higher. This cost is also measured by two 
proxies. The first (FCOST1) is calculated by the ratio financial costs/(total debt - accounts payable). In the 
second one (FCOST2) we do not eliminate accounts payable of the total debt. On the other hand, the 
empirical evidence demonstrates that return also negatively affects measures of working capital 
management. The ratios earnings before interest and taxes over total asset (PRO1) and earnings before 
interest and taxes over sales (PRO2) are used in our analysis as proxies for this variable.  
Thus, Net Trade Cycle can be explained by the following variables:  
 NTC*= f(internal resources, growth options, leverage, size, fixed assets, probability of 
         financial distress, cost of external finance, profitability) 
Firms may be very different from each other and there are other characteristics that might influence their 
Net Trade Cycle that are difficult to measure or hard to obtain, and which are not in our model. Therefore, 
we use panel data, because it allows us control for unobservable heterogeneity, making it possible to 
exclude biases deriving from the existence of individual effects (Hsiao, 1985). Additionally, we can also 
include time effects to capture the influence of economic factors that may also affect the length of Net 
Trade Cycle. Finally, it allows us examine a partial adjustment model to confirm whether firms pursue a 
target Net Trade Cycle.  
If there is a target Net Trade Cycle, firms should take the appropriate steps to achieve it. However, 
adjustment is not immediate because firms have to bear costs of adjustment, so they will adjust their 
current NTC according to the following expression: 
                         10)1,,*(1,, <<−−=−− γγ tiNTCtiNTCtiNTCtiNTC            (1) 
where NTCi,t  is the Net Trade Cycle in the period t, and NTC*i,t is the target Net Trade Cycle, which is 
estimated from the following equation:  
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where  ti,ε is a random disturbance and  kβ  are the unknown parameters to be estimated.  
The expression )*( 1,, −− titi NTCNTC  is the adjustment required to reach the firm’s target NTC, and 
the coefficient  γ  measures the speed of adjustment, which is inversely related to adjustment costs, and 
takes values between 0 and 1. If 0=γ , then 1,, −= titi NTCNTC , and the current Net Trade Cycle 
remains as in the previous period, indicating that companies bear high adjustment costs. If, in contrast, 
1=γ , then titi NTCNTC ,, *= , and firms immediately adjust their Net Trade Cycle to their target. 
If we substitute equation (2) into equation (1) and we include the unobservable heterogeneity and the time 
dummy variables, the current NTC is determined by the following expression:  
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Parameter  iη captures other characteristics of firms which are not observable but which have a significant 
impact on the length of the Net Trade Cycle. These change across companies but remain fixed for a given 
firm through time. The variable tλ , on the contrary, is a time dummy that changes in time but is equal for 
all firms in each of the time periods considered. This parameter is designed to capture the influence of 
economic factors that also may affect the length of this Cycle, but that firms cannot control. Finally, the 
parameters   ti,υ are random disturbances.  
We use the instrumental variable estimation method to avoid the problem of endogeneity, which appears 
to be evident in our analysis, as several studies have shown. For example, the working capital 
management might affect profitability (Jose et al., 1996; Shin and Soenen, 1998; Deloof, 2003; and 
Garcia and Martinez, 2007) and firms´ sales (Blinder and Maccini, 1991; Smith, 1987; Emery, 1987; 
Deloof and Jegers, 1996; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; and Ng et al., 1999). If we do not control for 
endogeneity, it might seriously affect the estimation results. Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed the 
application of the General Method of Moment (GMM) to the equation in first differences. We use two-
step GMM estimator because, although the estimator of instrumental variables in one stage is always 
consistent, if the disturbances show heteroskedasticity, the estimation in two stages increases efficiency. 
 
3.2. Data 
The data for this analysis were obtained from three sources of information. First, data from financial 
statements have been taken from the SABI (Iberian Balance Sheets Analysis System) database, which 
was developed by Bureau Van Dijk. Second, the market value of equity was extracted from CNMV 
(Spanish Security Exchange Commission). Finally, Gross Domestic product data were collected from the 
Bank of Spain. 
Our data consists of non-financial Spanish firms listed on the Spain Stock Exchange for the period 1997-
2004. We have selected firms whose information is available for at least five consecutive years between 
1997 and 2004. From this, we obtained a panel comprising 502 observations corresponding to 60 firms.  
 
Table 1 
Summary of Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev Min Median Max 
NTC 115.19 96.506 -29.73 91.46 590.91 
CFLOW 0.1687 0.1279 -0.053 0.1303 0.7371 
GROWTH1 1.3836 0.7360 0.5758 1.1650 5.5831 
GROWTH2 2.074 2.2875 0.1546 1.4696 2.0257 
LEV 0.5833 0.1619 0.078 0.5986 0.9521 
ASSETS 4,276,179 11,700,000 14,882 403,551 91,800,000 
SALES 2,447,147 6,076,944 3,471 362,130.5 44,000,000 
AF 0.5059 0.2172 0.0711 0.4967 0.9872 
ZSCORE 0.3035 0.1575 0.0179 0.2899 0.7285 
FCOST1 0.0593 0.0411 0.0048 0.050 0.3772 
FCOST2 0.0411 0.02767 0.0025 0.0363 0.2206 
PRO1 0.0706 0.0509 -0.1222 0.0633 0.3181 
PRO2 0.1094 0.1070 -0.1443 0.0861 0.6975 
GDP 0.0382 0.0079 0.024 0.036 0.05 
Notes: NTC represents the Net Trade Cycle; CFLOW the cash flows generated by the firm; GROWTH 1 and GROWTH2 the 
growth opportunities; LEV the leverage; ASSETS the total assets in thousands of euros; SALES the sales in thousands of euros; 
AF the investment in fixed assets; ZSCORE the probability of financial distress; FCOST1 and FCOST2 the cost of external finance; 
PRO1 and PRO2 the profitability; and GDP the Gross Domestic Product growth. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of our sample. If we observe the mean values, we can see 
that the mean Net Trade Cycle in our sample is 115.19 days. These firms have had positive growth 
perspectives during the selected research period and an investment in fixed assets over the total assets of 
51.6%. They generate a cash flow of 16.9% over sales and present 58.3% of debt over total assets. Their 
profitability over assets and sales are 7% and 10.9%, respectively.  
 
4.  Results 
Table 2 shows the results from regressing Net Trade Cycle on the different variables explained above. To 
confirm the robustness of our results we present the estimation of equation (3) using alternative proxies 
for some independent variables. In addition, in column (6) we estimate the model including the Gross 
Domestic Product growth and eliminating the time dummies to avoid the multicollinearity problem, since 
these dummies should capture that information. The m2 statistic and Hansen test also are presented. The 
m2 statistic indicates there is no second-order serial correlation, and Hansen Test shows the absence of 
correlation between instruments and error term. We also present the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for 
each independent variable. Our VIF tests are lower than 5, so there is no multicollinarity problem in our 
sample (Studenmund, 1997). In all estimations we control for industry effects. 
Table 2 
Determinants of Net Trade Cycle 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) VIF 
NTCit-1 0.3705*** 
(26.95) 
0.3794*** 
(26.33) 
0.3510*** 
(29.22) 
0.4173*** 
(34.07) 
0.4050*** 
(33.40) 
0.4003*** 
(42.20) 
1.58 
CFLOW 237.44*** 
(4.82) 
181.31*** 
(3.04) 
175.26*** 
(3.29) 
206.61*** 
(3.25) 
332.85*** 
(2.99) 
207.81*** 
(5.03) 
2.86 
GROWTH1 -12.7981*** 
(-3.75) 
- -15.4135*** 
(-5.58) 
-12.0809*** 
(-2.83) 
-20.99*** 
(-5.64) 
-16.7198*** 
(-5.76) 
1.23 
GROWTH2 - 
 
-4.6588*** 
(-2.77) 
- - - -  
LEV 2.1479 
(0.07) 
27.9474 
(0.80) 
9.1483 
(0.25) 
34.7871 
(1.03) 
46.4511 
(1.30) 
9.1026 
(0.47) 
2.12 
SIZE1 -8.7338*** 
(-3.00) 
-10.1825*** 
(-2.59) 
- -7.7511*** 
(-3.00) 
-10.5788*** 
(-3.81) 
-8.9595*** 
(-4.96) 
2.29 
SIZE2 - 
 
- -13.5618*** 
(-4.83) 
- - - - 
AF -101.90*** 
(-4.25) 
-93.845*** 
(-3.34) 
-77.041*** 
(-2.99) 
-51.963* 
(-1.78) 
-73.2563*** 
(-3.00) 
-96.6829*** 
(-5.31) 
3.24 
ZSCORE 184.28*** 
(6.44) 
207.09*** 
(6.80) 
181.01*** 
(6.01) 
150.06*** 
(4.85) 
110.17*** 
(4.25) 
127.6166*** 
(8.02) 
2.80 
FCOST1 -345.13*** 
(-5.91) 
-354.43*** 
(-5.31) 
-322.34*** 
(-6.52) 
- -317.89*** 
(-5.21) 
-272.628*** 
(-9.47) 
1.07 
FCOST2 - 
 
- - -270.48*** 
(-3.60) 
- -  
PRO1 -362.98*** 
(-4.15) 
-354.04*** 
(-3.61) 
-263.50** 
(-2.53) 
-226.87** 
(-2.59) 
- -287.14*** 
(-3.89) 
2.21 
PRO2 - 
 
- -  -249.05** 
(-2.30) 
-  
GDP 
 
- - - - - 438.66*** 
(4.58) 
 
m2 -0.58 -0.52 -0.59 -0.49 -0.51 -0.51  
Hansen Test 36.15 (221) 42 (221) 41.08 (221) 38.47 (221) 40.24 (221) 43.75 (223)  
Observations 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 
Notes: NTC represents the Net Trade Cycle; CFLOW the cash flows generated by the firm; GROWTH 1 and GROWTH2 the 
growth opportunities; LEV the leverage; SIZE1 and  SIZE2 the size; AF the investment in fixed assets; ZSCORE the probability of 
financial distress; FCOST1 and FCOST2 the cost of external finance; PRO1 and PRO2 the profitability; and GDP the Gross Domestic 
Product growth. 
Z statistic in brackets. 
* Indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1%. level 
m2 is a serial correlation test of second-order using residuals of first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation. Hansen test is a test of over-identifying restrictions distributed asymptotically under null 
hypothesis of validity of instruments as Chi-squared. Degrees of freedom in brackets. 
VIF represents the Variance Inflation Factor for each independent variable. 
 
The results show that the coefficient of the lagged Net Trade Cycle is positive and significant at the 1% 
level in all the estimations made. Hence, our hypothesis on the dynamic nature of working capital 
management is not rejected and we contribute to the existing literature on working capital management, 
finding that companies have a target Net Trade Cycle and follow an adjustment process to reach this 
target. In addition, this coefficient is roughly 0.4 in all the estimations made, indicating a relatively quick 
speed of adjustment )6.0( =γ which appears to support the idea that the costs of being away from target 
cycles are significant for our sample and that a good working capital management might be very 
important for them.  
The adjustment process is a trade-off between the adjustment costs towards a target cycle and the costs of 
being in disequilibrium. Our findings indicate that the costs of being in disequilibrium are greater than the 
adjustment costs. One possible reason might be the importance of bank credit for Spanish companies. The 
financial system of the European Union is classified as a bank-based system, except for the UK where 
capital markets are well developed (Schmidt and Tyrell, 1997). Thus, Spain has a banking oriented 
financial system with an important role played by the banks.  
As we expected, we find that firms have a larger Net Trade Cycle when they are capable of generating 
more internal funds, so supporting the argument of Fazzari and Petersen (1993) that the investment in 
working capital might be constrained by a shortage of internal funds. In addition, we obtain that this 
variable has the largest economic impact on the dependent variable. Thus, we obtain that an increase of 
one standard deviation in the variable internal funds increases the NTC by 41.8% (over the mean).  
Unlike the empirical evidence, and as we also expected, our results show that the coefficient of growth 
perspectives is significant and negative. Hence, we obtain that companies with larger growth perspectives 
have a shorter Net Trade Cycle, supporting the idea that these firms tend to use more trade credit as a 
source of finance for their growth (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; and Cuñat, 2007), while companies with 
sales declines tend to extend more credit to their customers so as to increase their sales (Emery, 1987; and 
Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Moreover, the economic significance of the influence of this variable on the 
Net Trade Cycle shows that, all other things being equal, an increase in the growth options of one 
standard deviation produces a reduction in the NTC of 13%.  
With regard to the effects of leverage on Net trade Cycle, none of the coefficients estimated for this 
variable are significant. Consequently, we cannot provide any empirical support for the argument that 
firms that are capable of obtaining more external financing have a longer Net Trade Cycle. Similarly, we 
cannot provide any empirical support for the Chiou et al. (2006) argument that debt ratio negatively 
affects the measures of working capital management. These authors suggest that their results are due to 
the fact that according to the pecking order theory firms only raise their debt ratio when their internal 
capital is depleted, so they tend to have a more efficient working capital management in this situation. 
The coefficient of the variable size is negative and significant in all estimations at the 1% level, which 
demonstrates that larger firms have a shorter Net Trade Cycle, even though they should have fewer 
difficulties in obtaining funding and less financial constraints. This result might be interpreted as meaning 
that these firms have a larger bargaining power with suppliers and customers, so they have a more 
efficient working capital management. Although smaller firms have less access to capital markets they 
have to extend more credit to guarantee their products, given their lower reputations (Long et al., 1993; 
Lee and Stowe, 1993; and Pike et al., 2005), while they are offered less trade credit (Niskanen and 
Niskanen, 2006). In addition, the economic impact of this variable is relevant, since if it decreases by one 
standard deviation the dependent variable increases over its mean by 23.19%.  
We also observe, as in other studies, that the investment in fixed assets has a negative effect on the Net 
Trade Cycle, despite the fact that firms with a higher fixed investment also have a better access to capital 
market. This result appears to support the argument developed by Fazzari and Petersen (1993) that the 
working capital competes with the investment in fixed assets for the funds of the firms when they have 
financial constraints. With regard to the economic effect on the dependent variable, an increase of one 
standard deviation in the variable fixed assets reduces the Net Trade cycle by 30.5%.  
As we expected, we find that firms with a higher probability of insolvency have a shorter NTC, since the 
ZSCORE sign is positive and significant at the 1% level in all the estimations carried out. The agency 
conflicts are more pronounced for these firms, so they have more difficulties in obtaining capital. So, they 
tend to have larger accounts payable (Niskasen and Niskasen, 2006), because suppliers tend to lend to 
them when banks do not (Cuñat, 2007). In addition, this also could be interpreted as meaning that firms 
with a large probability of insolvency tend to extend less credit to their customers and might have a lower 
investment in inventories. This variable has the second most important economic impact (around 40%).  
The coefficient of the variable that measures the cost of external capital is also negative and significant, 
which demonstrates that the Net Trade Cycle also depends on the cost of financing, as we suggested 
above. In fact, our results indicate that an increase of one standard deviation in the cost of external 
finance reduces NTC by 19.6%.  
Our results show, as the empirical evidence, that firms with a higher profitability have a shorter Net Trade 
Cycle. It is known that these firms can obtain funds more easily, but that, like larger firms, they also have 
greater bargaining power with suppliers and customers (Shin and Soenen, 1998). Hence, this result  
appears to support the idea that these firms tend to receive significantly more credit from their suppliers 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1997) and hold lower finished goods inventories (Blazenco and Vandezande, 2003), 
while firms facing profitability problems tend to increase trade credit receivable prior to entering financial 
distress (Molina and Preve, 2006). There is also a relevant economic impact since an increase in one 
standard deviation in this variable involves a reduction in the Net Trade Cycle of 25.5%. 
Finally, in column 6 we include the Gross Domestic Product growth, since this variable could affect the 
individual components of the Net Trade Cycle, such as accounts receivable (Smith, 1987; and Walker, 
1991), inventories (Blinder and Maccini, 1991; Carpenter et al., 1994; and Kashyap et al., 1994), and 
accounts payable (Nilsen, 2002). Our results show that the Gross Domestic Product growth positively 
influences the length of the Net Trade Cycle, which demonstrates that when economic growth is higher 
companies have a longer Net Trade Cycle. However, we should mention that at only 4.9% this variable 
has the smallest economic impact. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
This paper extends empirical evidence on the working capital management in several important 
dimensions, including the treatment of unobservable heterogeneity and endogeneity problems. Unlike 
previous studies, we assume that firms have an optimal working capital level and we examine the 
determinants of current WCM in the presence of adjustment costs. Net Trade Cycle is used as a measure 
of working capital management. The proposed model is corroborated using a sample of non-financial 
Spanish companies over the period 1997-2004. Our findings are consistent with the view that firms adjust 
their current Net Trade Cycle to the target NTC gradually over time due to the presence of adjustment 
costs.  
The results also suggest that the Net Trade Cycle depends on the firm´s bargaining power with its 
suppliers and customers as well as on financial factors such as the availability of internal finance, cost of 
financing and financial constraints. Our results indicate that companies that are capable of generating 
more internal funds have a longer cycle, which is consistent with the argument of Fazzari and Petersen 
(1993) that the investment in working capital might be constrained by a shortage of internal funds. On the 
contrary, this cycle is shorter for firms with greater profitability and larger firms, which appears to 
provide support to the argument that companies with a greater bargaining power hold a more aggessive 
working capital policy. Investment in fixed assets negatively influences the length of this cycle, so the 
argument of Fazzari and Petersen (1993) that the working capital competes with the investment in fixed 
assets for the funds of the firms when they have financial constraints is also consistent with these results. 
Our findings also show that growth opportunities, probability of financial distress, and cost of external 
financing negatively affect Net Trade Cycle. Unlike earlier studies, our results suggest that Net Trade 
Cycle does not depend on the leverage. Finally, we obtain that when economic growth is higher, 
companies have a longer Cycle.  
Further research focused on similar studies in countries with different institutional characteristics and 
financial system would seem to be appropriate, since the speed of adjustment and the effect of 
explanatory variables on NTC might be different. Such research could focus on the analysis of the 
stability of the speed of adjustment when a longer time period is available.  
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